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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Douglas Steinemer appeals from the district court’s summary dismissal of
his post-conviction petition.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The following facts and proceedings of Steinemer’s underlying criminal
case are derived from the Idaho Court of Appeals’ unpublished decision in State
v. Steinemer, Docket No. 39869, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 472 at 1-2
(Idaho App. April 30, 2013):
On June 28, 2003, Steinemer kidnapped a woman in
Mountain Home at knifepoint, bound her hands, covered her eyes
and mouth with tape, and transferred her to the cab of a semi-truck.
Steinemer and another individual, later identified as Hans Michael
Holsopple, Steinemer’s biological father, proceeded to drive from
Mountain Home toward the Oregon-Idaho border, stopping multiple
times to rape the victim who was being held in the sleeper area of
the truck’s cabin. The two men eventually released the victim, and
she was able to contact a friend who took her to the hospital. DNA
samples were collected as part of a sexual assault examination,
and the DNA profiles of two unknown individuals were entered into
a national DNA database. In 2009, police were notified that
Steinemer’s DNA profile, which apparently had been recently
added to the national database as part of an unrelated Florida
case, appeared to match the profile of one of the victim’s previously
unidentified attackers. Steinemer was arrested in February 2010.
After being advised of his Miranda rights, Steinemer admitted to
kidnapping and raping the victim. [Footnote omitted.]
Steinemer was indicted on one count of kidnapping in the
first degree and three counts of rape. Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Steinemer pleaded guilty to kidnapping in the first
degree and to one count of rape, and the remaining rape charges
were dismissed. Approximately six weeks later, Steinemer filed a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He asserted that, prior to
pleading guilty, he had not seen or heard the recording of a police
interview with the victim in which the victim made statements that,
1

according to Steinemer, supported a defense to the crimes, and
that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had seen the recorded
interview. After a hearing,[1] the district court denied Steinemer’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court imposed
concurrent unified sentences of thirty years with thirteen-year
determinate terms.
The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order denying
Steinemer’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 5.
On July 11, 2014, Steinemer filed a post-conviction petition with a
supporting affidavit, and, at his request, he was appointed counsel. (R., pp. 4-16,
84.) The state filed a motion for summary dismissal and an Answer and Brief in
Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal with attached exhibits -- including a
transcript of the hearing on Steinemer’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (R.,
pp.20-22, 28-81.)

Steinemer filed a memorandum in response to the state’s

answer and the state’s motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.107-113.) After a
short hearing without any testimony (see generally 1/16/15 Tr.), the district court
entered a Memorandum Decision and Order granting the state’s motion for
summary dismissal and a Judgment dismissing Steinemer’s post-conviction
petition with prejudice.

(R., pp.117-123, 124-125.)

Steinemer filed a timely

Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.126-130.)

1

At the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Steinemer was
represented by a different attorney (Mr. Chastain) than his trial counsel, and the
state presented testimony of an investigator from the prosecutor’s office (Mr.
Tuttle) and Steinemer’s trial counsel (Mr. DeFranco). (R., pp.56-66.)
2

ISSUE
Steinemer states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in concluding that advice to lie to the
court is not deficient performance especially in this situation
wherein a simple alternative was available – to either have shown
Mr. Steinemer the video/audio prior to the plea hearing or to request
a delay in the entry of the plea long enough to show Mr. Steinemer
the audio/video discovery?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Steinemer failed to establish that the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his post-conviction petition?

3

ARGUMENT
Steinemer Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Post-Conviction Petition
A.

Introduction
The district court granted the state’s motion to summarily dismiss

Steinemer’s post-conviction petition because, pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c), none
of his claims presented a genuine issue of material fact. (R., pp.117-123.) On
appeal, Steinemer contends the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his
claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance under Strickland2
because counsel allegedly advised Steinemer to “lie” on his guilty plea advisory
form about whether he had reviewed the video/audio recordings of the victim’s
statement. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.6-8.) Contrary to Steinemer’s argument, the
district court properly summarily dismissed his claim.
B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court’s

application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State,
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001).

On appeal from summary

dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the
applicant’s favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v.
State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State,
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely
2

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
4

review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco,
Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).
C.

General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil

proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). However, a petition for post-conviction
relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain
more than “a short and plain statement of the claim” that would suffice for a
complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (referencing I.R.C.P. 8).
The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations. Id. (citing I.C. § 194903). Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application
must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary
hearing.

Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982);

Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own
initiative.

“To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
5

583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to
summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 “if the applicant’s evidence raises
no genuine issue of material fact” as to each element of petitioner’s claims.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c));
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.
While a court must accept a petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, the
court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho
797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not
entitle the petitioner to relief, the district court is not required to conduct an
evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition. Id. (citing Stuart v. State, 118
Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)).

“Allegations contained in the

application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly
disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a
matter of law.” Id.
D.

Legal Standards Applicable To Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-

conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting
prejudice.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v.

Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). With respect to the
deficient performance prong, the United States Supreme Court has articulated
the defendant’s burden under Strickland as follows:
6

To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a
conviction must show that counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. A court considering a claim
of ineffective assistance must apply a strong presumption that
counsel’s representation was within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. The challenger’s burden is to show that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) (citations and quotations omitted).
“This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions
of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are
based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation.” Arellano v. State, 158 Idaho 708,
710, 351 P.3d 636, 638 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231,
233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994)).
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different. Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. “A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. (citations
and quotations omitted). When the alleged deficiency involves counsel’s advice
in relation to a guilty plea, “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and citations omitted).
“Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the
court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under
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the circumstances.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (citing Roe v.
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)).
E.

Steinemer Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court’s Summary
Dismissal Of His Post-Conviction Claim That His Trial Counsel Provided
Ineffective Assistance By Allegedly Advising Him To Lie On His Guilty
Plea Advisory Form
Steinemer contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his

claim that his trial counsel was ineffective because he allegedly advised
Steinemer to “lie” on his guilty plea advisory form by checking “yes” to indicate he
had reviewed the video/audio recordings of the victim’s statements.

(See

generally Appellant’s Brief.) At the hearing on Steinemer’s motion to withdraw
his guilty pleas, his former trial counsel, Mr. DeFranco, testified to the contrary,
as follows:
Q.

Did you have an opportunity to visit with the defendant prior
to him pleading guilty?

A.

I did.

Q.

And did you talk with him about the guilty plea form?

A.

I did.

Q.

At this point, did the defendant have any questions,
concerns, reservations?

A.

I know we discussed it, so I believe whatever questions or
concerns that he had were satisfied before we went through
the formality of pleading guilty.

Q.

On the affidavit in support of motion to disqualify counsel,
allegation number four, it specifically states that on the guilty
plea advisory form there is a question regarding the
discovery in the case and my attorney told me to, quote,
“check yes as having seen the video and listened to the
audio.”
8

A.

Right.

Q.

Is that something that you did with the defendant?

A.

I read that. And.

MR. CHASTAIN: Mr. DeFranco read what, read the guilty plea
form or something else?
THE WITNESS: The guilty plea form. And also I read the affidavit
where he said that his -- me, that I told him that he needed to
check this.
And to say I have an Independent recollection of
exactly what I said, I don’t. But I knew what he was saying.
What he was saying was that I told him that he better check
that – that he better check that. And if we discussed it in that
context I would not have said that you better check that. I
would have said that if you want to plead guilty and you want
the Court to accept your plea, you have to check this. So I
think I am explaining myself.
It was a matter of semantics, though, and I felt like
when I read the affidavit or the suggestion that somehow I
had forced him to check that and that is not true.
(R., p.63 (Tr., p.58, L.8 – p.59, L.25).)
During cross-examination, the following colloquy between Steinemer’s
counsel and Mr. DeFranco occurred:
Q.

Were you satisfied at the time you prepared this affidavit for
him that prior to entering the guilty plea he had not seen or
heard the audio/video interview of the victim?

A.

No, I wasn’t, because I don’t know that the public defender[3]
didn’t do that with him. In fact, I was surprised when he told
me that he hadn’t seen it.

3

According to the district court, after Steinemer was indicted on April 20, 2010,
Ada County Public Defender David Simonaitis was appointed to represent him.
(R., p.117.) Over a year later, on April 29, 2011, Mr. Simonaitis withdrew as
Steinemer’s attorney and Mr. DeFranco replaced him as an Ada County public
defender conflicts counsel. (R., p.117.)
9

(R., p.65 (Tr., p.66, Ls.2-9).)
The district court considered Mr. DeFranco’s testimony together with
Steinemer’s supporting evidence and properly determined that, based upon the
applicable legal standards and underlying criminal record, Steinemer failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on
his post-conviction claim. (See R., pp.117-123.) The court explained:
As to his second assertion concerning ineffective assistance
of counsel during the guilty plea process, Petitioner has not
demonstrated deficient performance by Mr. DeFranco. Petitioner
asserts that he initially checked “No” on the guilty plea advisory
form as to whether he had been able to review all of the discovery
in his case, but Mr. DeFranco advised him that the Court would not
accept his guilty plea unless he answered “Yes” to that question.
See Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction Petition at 1-2.
This issue was previously addressed in the Court’s Memorandum
Decision and Order on Petitioner’s motion to withdraw guilty plea, in
which the Court concluded that “Mr. DeFranco did not force
Defendant to change his answer to the question in the guilty plea
advisory form that he had the chance to review all discovery in the
possession of his attorney before entering his plea. Rather, this
was a decision Defendant made so the Court would accept his
plea.”[4] See State’s Answer, Exhibit 1 at 4-5. Mr. DeFranco’s
testimony at the hearing on the motion to withdraw guilty plea was
consistent with Petitioner’s assertion that Mr. DeFranco indicated
Petitioner would have to answer “Yes” to that question on the guilty
plea advisory form if Petitioner wanted the Court to accept his guilty
plea. Mr. DeFranco was clear that he did not force Petitioner to
answer “Yes.” See State’s Answer, Exhibit 2 at 59. The record
supports the conclusion that Petitioner made the decision to
change his answer to “Yes,” and Mr. DeFranco’s advice concerning
this issue did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Accordingly, summary dismissal of this claim is
appropriate.
(R., p.121.)
4

Because the issues are closely related, some of the facts and analysis in the
district court’s decision denying Steinemer’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea
are relevant here. (See R., pp.39-44.)
10

By concluding that Mr. DeFranco’s advice did not “fall below an objective
standard of reasonableness,” the court necessarily found that Steinemer failed to
show deficient performance under Strickland. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 104.
Indeed, Steinemer’s trial counsel advised him that the court would not accept his
guilty pleas unless he checked “yes” to the question of whether he had reviewed
all the discovery – which was (presumably) literally true. Giving such factually
correct information was not tantamount to telling Steinemer to lie to the court.
See Jefferson v. Bartlett, 2006 WL 3408020 *8 (D. Oregon 2006) (“[T]here is a
clear distinction between advising a client as to the likelihood of certain findings
by the jury and advising a client to lie.”). It was Steinemer’s decision on how to
proceed after receiving that information, and he chose to mark “yes” on the guilty
plea advisory form in order to have the court accept his plea. Moreover, as Mr.
DeFranco testified, he could not be certain (and was surprised to later learn) that
during the time Steinemer was represented by Mr. Simonaitis, Steinemer had not
reviewed the video/audio recordings of the victim’s statements. (See R., p.65
(Tr., p.66, Ls.2-9).) Steinemer’s attempt to characterize trial counsel’s advice as
a directive to “lie” is not supported by the record; therefore, he has failed to show
any error in the district court’s summary dismissal of his claim under the
“deficient performance” requirement of Strickland.
Additionally, or in the alternative, this Court may affirm the district court’s
summary dismissal of Steinemer’s post-conviction petition on any ground set
forth by the state in its motion for summary dismissal, including that Steinemer
failed to make a prima facie showing under the second requirement of Strickland
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-- prejudice. While a post-conviction petitioner is entitled to notice prior to the
summary dismissal of his post-conviction claims from either the court or from the
state’s motion to dismiss, I.C. § 19-4906; Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 522-523,
236 P.3d 1277, 1282-1283 (2010), an order of summary dismissal may be
affirmed on appeal on the grounds asserted in the state’s motion to dismiss if no
material issue of fact on those grounds is contained in the record. See Ridgley v.
State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925, 930 (2010); Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho
859, 864-865, 243 P.3d 675, 680-681 (Ct. App. 2010). In this case, the summary
dismissal of Steinemer’s claim should also be affirmed on the alternate ground
that he failed to meet the “prejudice” requirement of Strickland.5 (See R., pp.2022, 28-38.)
During the change of plea hearing, Steinemer was placed under oath and
then informed the court that his attorney satisfactorily answered his questions
about the plea advisory form, he filled out the form in his own handwriting, and all
the answers contained in the form were true and correct. (R., p.52 (Tr., p.18,
L.23 – p.19, L.22).) According to Anderson v. State, 746 N.W. 2d 901 (Minn.
App. 2008), false representations made by a defendant under oath have greater
significance than even a trial attorney’s advice to “lie.”

5

Steinemer’s decision to plead guilty came before his trial counsel allegedly
advised him to lie on the guilty plea form. Therefore, counsel’s advice could not
have led to Steinemer’s initial decision to plead guilty. Instead, Steinemer
appears to argue that he would have changed his mind about pleading guilty
after reviewing the victim’s recorded statements to law enforcement.
12

In Anderson, the Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected Anderson’s claim
that her attorney was ineffective for advising her to lie to the trial court by
admitting guilt, stating:
To the extent Anderson bases her appeal on the notion that
it is ineffective assistance for her lawyer to advise her to lie to the
court by admitting guilt to a crime her lawyer does not believe she
committed, the contention fails for at least three independent
reasons. First, the district court’s instruction to Anderson and its
administration of the oath to tell the truth at her plea hearing
superseded any defective advice by her trial attorney that she lie
about her guilt. Anderson’s sworn duty to tell the truth, as directed
by the oath, is too fundamental and obvious an obligation to be
dismissed by contrary advice to violate it, even if suggested or
encouraged by her attorney. “Our legal system depends on the
truthfulness of the testimony of witnesses and false testimony
strikes at the very heart of the administration of justice.” The
alleged advice to lie under oath should be rejected by even the
least enlightened defendant in the face of her fundamental duty to
tell the truth under oath; the alleged advice to lie therefore cannot
be deemed to have prejudiced Anderson under Strickland.
Anderson, 746 N.W. 2d at 908 (citations omitted); see Ex parte Tomlinson, 295
S.W.3d 412, 421 (Tex. App. 2009) (“Tomlinson, knowing he would be lying,
chose to plead guilty to the charges and to admit guilt . . .. Under these
circumstances, we cannot say that his guilty plea was the result of the erroneous
advice of counsel to such an extent that it rendered his plea involuntary or that,
absent the advice of counsel, he would not have pleaded guilty in order to obtain
a favorable plea bargain.”).
Even assuming, arguendo, trial counsel’s advice to Steinemer – that if he
wanted the court to accept his guilty plea he would have to check “yes” to
indicate he had reviewed discovery – was tantamount to a directive to “lie,”
Steinemer failed to show such advice resulted in prejudice by causing him to
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plead guilty. Steinemer made his own decision while under oath to check “yes”
and then tell the court that all his responses were true and correct – all in his
quest to have the court accept his guilty plea. As in Anderson, Steinemer’s
decision to lie to the court precludes him from showing that his counsel’s advice
prejudiced him under Strickland. Cf. State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 536537, 211 P.3d 775, 781-782 (Ct. App. 2008) (upholding denial of motion to
withdraw a guilty plea based on claim that counsel advised defendant to not
disclose a “secret deal” that induced defendant to plead guilty, where the record
supported trial court’s finding that defendant’s “desire to plead guilty was so
strong that he knowingly perjured himself in order to accomplish his goal”).
Moreover, as the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded previously, “it is
undisputed that Steinemer was aware of the victim’s statements before he
pleaded guilty[,]” noting: (1) Steinemer had the Grand Jury transcript and police
reports available to him, which contained the victim’s statements suggesting
Steinemer’s father controlled Steinemer, (2) Steinemer’s trial counsel testified at
the hearing on his motion to withdraw his pleas that, prior to Steinemer’s guilty
pleas, counsel discussed the defense of duress or coercion ten to twenty times
with him, based on the Grand Jury transcript and police reports, and (3) during a
recorded phone call from jail before he pleaded guilty, Steinemer said he would
submit the victim’s statements at trial so “the jury can hear her saying that . . .
she knows I was in fear of my father, she knows I was not . . . or I was in control
of my father and all that other good gossip stuff so that way the jury like
understands I had nothing to do with it.” Steinemer, Docket No. 39869, 2013

14

Unpublished Opinion No. 472 at 4-5. Based on the previous determination by
the Idaho Court of Appeals, Steinemer failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of
material fact about whether, given what he knew about the victim’s statements,
there was a reasonable probability that, absent trial counsel’s alleged advice to
lie about reviewing the victim’s recorded statements, he would not have pleaded
guilty. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 58.
The district court’s summary dismissal of Steinemer’s claim should be
affirmed on the additional or alternative ground that he failed to present a
genuine issue of material fact showing his trial counsel’s advice resulted in
prejudice under Strickland.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
order summarily dismissing Steinemer’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 18th day of May, 2016.

_/s/ John C. McKinney__
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 18th day of May, 2016, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
DEBORAH WHIPPLE
DENNIS BENJAMIN
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
at the following email addresses: dwhipple@nbmlaw.com, db@nbmlaw.com and
lm@nbmlaw.com.
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_/s/ John C. McKinney__
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Deputy Attorney General
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